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BOILERPLATE: WHAT CONSUMERS ACTUALLY
THINK ABOUT IT
FRANKLIN G. SNYDER & ANN M. MIRABITO*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult problems in modem contract law is the status of
standard terms-often called "boilerplate"-in consumer transactions.' On the
one hand, standard terms are good because they reduce costs and increase
efficiency and predictability.2 On the other hand, they can be used to impose
unfair terms on consumers and even to evade important public policies.3 There
is thus a vast and growing literature on the topic.'
We know for a fact that most consumers do not read standard terms.' They
* The authors are, respectively, Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law,
and Associate Professor, Department of Marketing, Hankamer School of Business, Baylor
University. The authors are grateful for research support from their respective institutions. Thanks
for helpful comments on this project from participants at the International Conference on Contracts
in San Antonio in February 2016, and a faculty workshop at the Southern Illinois University School
of Law in November 2018.
1. Yannis Bakos etal., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? ConsumerAttention toStandard-
Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUDS. 1, 2 (2014).
2. Steven W. Feldman, MutualAssent, Normative Degradation, and Mass Market Standard
Form Contracts-A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights and the
Rule of Law (Part 1), 62 Clev. St. L. Rev. 373, 385 (2014).
3. Burt Neubome, Ending LochnerLite, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 184 (2015) ("In
recent years, a new generation of contracts has surfaced imposing terns that require weaker
contracting parties to forego the ability to enforce their post-Lochner ights in an effective
manner.")
4. See, e.g., ELENA D'AGOSTINO, CONTRACTS OF ADHESION BETWEEN LAW AND
ECONOMICS: RETHINKING THE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE (2014); NANCY S. KIM, WRAP
CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE:
THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, ANDTHE RULE OFLAW (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation
Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 883 (2014); Kenneth K. Ching, Liberalism's
Fine Print: Boilerplate's Allusion to Human Nature, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 631 (2016); G. Marcus
Cole, Rational Consumer Ignorance: When and Why Consumers ShouldAgree to Form Contracts
Without Even Reading Them, 11 J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 413 (2015); Orit Gan, The Many Faces of
Contractual Consent, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 615 (2017); Charles L. Knapp, Is There a "Duty to
Read"?, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 1083 (2015); Peter Linzer, Contract as Evil, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 971
(2015); Nathan B. Oman, Reconsidering Contractual Consent: Why We Shouldn't Worry Too Much
About Boilerplate and Other Puzzles, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 215 (2017); Cheryl B. Preston, "'Please
Note, You Have Waived Everything": Can Notice Redeem Online Contracts?, 64 AM. U. L. REV.
535 (2015); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Intuitive Formalism in Contract, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2109
(2015); Eric A. Zacks, The Restatement (Second) ofContracts § 211: Unfulfilled Expectations and
the Future of Modern Standardized Consumer Contracts, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 733 (2016);
Neubome, supra note 3.
5. See Bakos et al., supra note 1.
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will not read them before they sign the writing or click "I agree" or "Buy now"
on their screen.' They will not read them when they open the box and find them
inside.7 This behavior is entirely rational and entirely expected-no one could
function if she had to read the terms and conditions of every web site she
happened to visit or every product she purchased.8 We know that she will ignore
the terms, yet enforceability of contract terms under both current law and the
proposed new Restatement of Consumer Contracts9 will depend on whether the
consumer had the opportunity to read the terms-or, more accurately, opportunity
to ignore them-before the purchase is made.'0
But is that opportunity of any value to consumers? Do they see any
distinction between terms on a web site and terms that accompany the product
when it arrives? A vast and growing legal literature focuses on this question," but
it is curiously limited. We know what judges and lawyers think that consumers
think about boilerplate terms.2 But what consumers themselves think is still
missing. Although business school scholarship is rich with studies of consumer
beliefs and consumer behavior,3 little of that research seems to have diffused
itself into the legal world.
Our goal here is to help fill that gap. To begin to answer this question, we use
a scenario-based experimental design to explore consumer attitudes toward
common contract erms. In particular, we focus on (a) their understanding of
baseline legal rules and commercial norms; (b) their view of the enforceability
and fairness of standard terms that change those rules; and (c) whether their views
of these issues change depending on whether they had a chance to view the terms
before agreeing to the contract. Our goal is to determine whether current contract
law-and the changes to the law recommended by the drafters of the proposed,
RCC-reflect distinctions that have any meaningful value to consumer buyers.
II. BOILERPLATE AND CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS
The average American consumer is likely a party to dozens or hundreds of
standard-form contracts at any given time.'4 These agreements often contain
6. See generally Jennifer Femminella, Online Terms and Conditions Agreements: Bound
by the Web, 17 St. John's J. Legal Comm. 87 (2003) (discussing enforceability of clickwrap and
shrinkwrap agreements); see also Bakos et al., supra note 1.
7. See generally Bakos et al., supra note 1; Femminella, supra note 6.
8. Bakos et al., supra note 1. See generally Preston, supra note 4 (discussing the consumer
benefits of not reading the terms and conditions).
9. Restatement of Consumer Contracts § 2 (Am. Law Inst., Council Draft No. 5 2018).
10. See generally Knapp, supra note 4, at 1086; Preston, supra note 4.
11. See RADIN, supra note 4.
12. Id.
13. As typified in a plethora of scholarly journals such as Journal of Consumer Behaviour,
Journal of Consumer Psychology, Journal of ConsumerResearch, Research in Consumer Behavior,
Journal of Consumer Affairs, and Journal of Consumer Culture.
14. See generally Bakos et al., supra note 1.
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many pages of "fine print" or "boilerplate" terms that specify in great detail the
duties and obligations of the parties." These contracts are drafted entirely by one
party-always the seller or service provider-and are presented on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.'6 No one except the lawyers who write them and litigate over them
ever read them.'7 We know, in fact, that of those who buy online, only some 0.1
percent of consumers ever click on the "terms and conditions" link, and that and
ninety percent of those who do spend less than two minutes looking at the dense
and legalistic verbiage.18
These facts become important because under American contract law the
question of whether standard terms become part of the contract depends primarily
on whether the seller provided the terms to the buyer before the transaction
closed."t Consumers will ignore these terms whether they are received before or
after the transaction closes, but enforceability will depend on whether the buyer
had what we can think of as the opportunity to ignore the terms in advance.2" If
the buyer actually ignored the terms, they apply.2' If the buyer lacked the
opportunity to ignore, they do not.22 This concept is neatly set out in the proposed
Restatement of Consumer Contracts ("RCC"), which provides:
(a) A standard contract term is adopted as part of a consumer contract
if the consumer manifests assent o the transaction after receiving:
(1) a reasonable notice of the standard contract term and of the intent
to include the term as part of the consumer contract, and
(2) a reasonable opportunity to review the standard contract term.
(b) When a standard contract term is available for review only after
the consumer manifests assent o the transaction, the standard contract
term is adopted as part of the consumer contract if:
(1) before manifesting assent to the transaction, the consumer
receives a reasonable notice regarding the existence of the standard
contract term intended to be part of the consumer contract, informing the
consumer about the opportunity to review and terminate the contract, and
15. Id; see also Preston, supra note 4.
16. Oman, supra note 4, at 217.
17. See generally id.
18. These figures are from the very exhaustive and fascinating study in Bakos et al., supra
note 1, at 19-22. The authors pursue a wide range of variables but find no situation in which any
significant number of buyers spend any significant amount of time looking at contract terms.
19. See generally Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. Rev. 797 (2007)
(discussing courts' willingness to uphold the terms of shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap
agreements as long as they were provided to the consumer, regardless of affirmative consent).
20. See generally Preston, supra note 4, at 539-40.
21. See generally Kim, supra note 19 (arguing that contractual assent should be split into
"actual" and "presumed" assent as a means to address consumer ignorance of Terms of Use and
boilerplate terms online).
22. See generally id.
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explaining that the failure to terminate would result in the adoption of the
standard contract term; and
(2) after manifesting assent o the transaction, the consumer receives
a reasonable opportunity to review the standard contract term; and
(3) after the standard contract term is made available for review, the
consumer has a reasonable opportunity to terminate the transaction
without unreasonable cost, loss of value, or personal burden, and does
not exercise that power.
(c) If the consumer manifests assent to the transaction, a contract
exists even if some of the standard contract terms are not adopted. In
such case, the terms of the contract are those adopted under subsections
(a) and (b), and, if the consumer elects, the unadopted standard terms,
along with any terms supplied by law.23
While the proposed RCC in general is controversial,24 this provision faithfully
tracks existing law. 5 Under existing rules and the proposed Restatement, for
example, we can distinguish among four different formation scenarios: traditional
signed writings, "clickwrap," "browsewrap," and "shrinkwrap."
Traditional signed writing. If the consumer signs a physical piece of paper
that embodies the terms, they are binding even when they have been neither read
nor understood. The consumer had access to them, and thus failure to read them
does not make them unenforceable.26 They may be policed for unconscionability,
illegality, or violation of public policy, but only the most outrageous terms are
likely to be struck under those doctrines.27
Clickwrap.2 ' A clickwrap contract is one in which an online purchaser is
presented with a set of standard terms and must click a button that says "I accept"
23. Restatement of Consumer Contracts § 2 (Am. Law Inst., Council Draft No. 5 2018)
(emphasis added).
24. See, e.g., Nicholas Malfitano, Criticism Follows PowerfulLaw Group To Next Project-A
'Troubling' Take On Consumer Contracts, FORBES.COM (June 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/legalnewsline/2 0 18/06/25/criticism-follows-powerful-law-group-to-next-project-a-troubling-
take-on-consumer-contracts/#7de2e4be2f6O [https://perma.cc/3ED6-K9Y7].
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The term "-wrap" for various types of electronic contracting comes from the original
concept of the "shrinkwrap" contract, so-called because of manufacturers who put terms inside
software and hardware boxes that were sealed with plastic film. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (breaking the film and opening the package was viewed as assent). In the same
manner that "-gate" became the go-to suffix for all political scandals, "-wrap" became a common
term for electronic contracts. There are other variants. See, e.g., Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F.
Supp.3d 359,394-401 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (adding "scroll-wrap" and "sign-in-wrap" to the lexicon).
Employee handbooks that contain contract terms are sometimes called "cubewrap." See Rachel
Amow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and WorkerMobility: The Dilution ofEmployee Bargaining
Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 963.
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(or something similar) before the transaction will be processed.29 The analogy to
the traditional writing is obvious; in these cases, if the consumer clicks the button,
the standard terms are enforceable for the same reasons as the traditional written
contract.3°
Browsewrap. This is the term used in situations where a party uses a web site
that states that use of the site signifies acceptance of the site's standard terms, but
there is no formal "I agree" place to click.31 Under current law, enforceability will
vary from person to person and website to website, depending on such factors as
design of the specific site and exactly what the individual consumer happened to
see.
32
Shrinkwrap. A licensor or manufacturer will often put its standard terms
inside product packaging, along with a statement hat using the product indicates
acceptance of the terms.33 Thus, where a purchaser who buys at a retail store or
by telephone will not see the terms until after the purchase contract is complete.34
The terms in this case are enforceable or not depending on the state and court in
which the suit happens to have been brought.3 5
Thus, the same term may become part of the contract between the same buyer
and the same seller depending entirely on how the buyer goes about buying the
goods or services. Two recent cases involving identically situated consumers
contracting for the same service from the same business on identical contract
29. Natch Greyes, A New Proposal for the Department of Justice's Interpretation of the
Computer Fraud &AbuseAct, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 293, 321 (2013).
30. Id. at 321-22.
31. Id. at322-23.
32. Id. at 323-25. Cases finding that no contract exists include Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 38 (2d Cir. 2002); McKee v. Audible, Inc., No. CV 17-1941-GW(Ex), 2017
WL 7388530, at *6 (C.D. Calif. Oct. 26, 2017); Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12-CV-03373-LHK,
2013 WL 5568706, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9,2013); In re Zappos.com, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058,
1064-65 (D. Nev. 2012); Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 789, 793
(N.D. I11. 2011). Cases coming to the opposite conclusion include Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,
356 F.3d 393, 401-04 (2d Cir. 2004); Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-
0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *4-6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); Cairo, Inc. v. CrossMedia Servs.,
Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 2005 WL 756610 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005); Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV-997654, 2003 WL 21406289 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7,2003). These cases tend
to very fact-intensive.
33. Femminella, supra note 6, at 88-89.
34. Id. at 89.
35. See id. at 91-95. The list of cases finding shrinkwrap terms enforceable includes Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997); DeFontes
v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061 (R.I. 2009); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998); M.A. Mortenson Co., v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash.2d 568,998
P.2d 305, 308 (Wash. 2000). Cases taking the opposite approach include Rogers v. Dell Computer
Corp., 138 P.3d 826 (Okla. 2005) (not enforceable); Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
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terms, illustrate this nicely. In Carey v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,36 the driver (in
Cleveland) clicked on a link on the web page to join the Uber ride-sharing
service, which incorporated linked terms which he did not review.37 In
Mohammed v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,38 the driver (in Chicago) asked an Uber
representative to set up the account and gave her his user name and password.39
In the course of the setup she clicked the link on his behalf" Both drivers
subsequently sued Uber, and Uber defended itself in each case by invoking its
standard terms.4 Both drivers were similarly situated and equally ignorant of the
terms.42 Yet Carey lost and Mohammed won, because Mohammed did not
personally see the link and click on it.43 The two cases suggest, as the RCC would
have it, that while consumers consistently and quite reasonably ignore the terms
in standard-form contracts, the opportunity to ignore them is so important that it
will often control whether the terms become part of the contract.
Outcomes such as these raise obvious questions. If the standard terms used
by a particular business (such as Uber) are not unfair or unreasonable, why aren't
all consumers bound? On the other hand, if the terms are unfair or unreasonable,
why are any consumers bound? On what ground might we say that the
applicability of particular terms should depend on how the contracting process
was conducted.
One possible answer is that consumers value the ability to see the terms in
advance. Perhaps the mere chance to look at them makes consumers feel
empowered, or perceive some other benefit. If so, then the rules may make sense,
because it is axiomatic that contract law is designed to achieve the parties' goals.
But we do not know whether that opportunity-so important to lawyers and
judges-has any perceived value for actual consumers.
Hence our study.
11. THE STUDY AND OUR FINDINGS
We used a scenario-based experimental design in which we presented study
participants with a situation involving a defective product and then asked a series
of questions about the seller's duty to compensate the buyer. We chose this
warranty/damages scenario for several reasons. To minimize confusion, we
wanted to use a situation that would be easily understandable, commonly
encountered, and reasonably important. Many standard terms in contracts-e.g.,
clauses relating arbitration, forum selection, choice of law, class-action
36. Carey v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 1: 1 6-cv- 1058,2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44340 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 27, 2017).
37. Id. at *1.
38. Mohammed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 3d 719 (N.D. I11. 2017).
39. Id. at 724.
40. Id.
41. See Carey, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44340, at *3-4; Mohammed, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 731.
42. Carey, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44340, at *10; Mohammed, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 731.
43. Carey, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44340, at * 17-19; Mohammed, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 730-32.
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waivers-can be difficult to understand and become important in only the tiny
sliver of serious disputes that have reached a lawyer's desk. Virtually every
consumer, however, has faced a product that fails to work and has had to invoke
the warranty the seller provides. Using a familiar scenario allowed us to isolate
only the timing of the consumer's receipt.4 4
To test this experimentally, we asked study participants to imagine their new
laptop computer has self-combusted. The manufacturer offers to replace the
admittedly defective equipment. The consumer, now leery of the reliability of the
manufacturer's equipment, instead requests a refund of the purchase price, but the
manufacturer refuses. In a follow-on scenario, the consumer also seeks damages
for harm to additional property caused by the combusting computer. While few
consumers have likely dealt with this precise situation, we believe it is one that
is easy for the average consumer to understand.
By way of background-this was not revealed to subj ects-under current law
the computer's failure in our scenario would amount legally to a breach of the
general warranty of merchantability.4 5 The normal default remedy for a buyer in
that situation is an award of money damages: "the difference at he time and place
of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted."'1 6 In this case, the buyer's damages
would likely amount to the value the computer "would have had" if it had worked
properly (presumably the purchase price) and its current value (zero).47 The
refund would thus likely approximate the buyer's normal damages.8 In addition,
the seller ordinarily would be liable for the damage to other property as
consequential damages of the breach.49
But sellers are not required to provide the warranty of merchantability and are
permitted to limit damages.5" They are free to substitute a repair-or-replacement
warranty for the ordinary warranty of merchantability, and they are free to
disclaim consequential damages.5 Thus, if the seller's repair-and-replace
44. We note that consumers may have strong views about the warranties that products should
carry, and the responsibilities that merchants should face. Some, for example, may believe that
merchants have a duty to provide more than standard repair-and-replacement warranties would
require. This might well affect their views as to the enforceability of such a clause. We do not
believe that this is a problem in our scenario because the consumer's substantive opinion of a
warranty-whether positive or negative-should have little effect on their views as to when it
should be disclosed.
45. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm'n 2004).
46. Id. § 2-714 (2).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 2-714.
49. Id. § 2-715(2).
50. See id. § 2-316(2)-(3).
51. See id. § 2-719(1)(a) ("the agreement may provide for remedies ... in substitution for
those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this
Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to... repair and replacement of non-conforming goods
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
warranty is part of the contract, it is enforceable against the consumer. As noted
above, the question whether it is part of the contract may depend on when the
buyer is presented with it.
52
Accordingly, some consumer participants were informed they had signed off
on the contract terms at the computer store prior to purchase in a signed written
agreement (we call this the "signed writing" scenario). A second group was
informed that they had clicked "I agree" to the terms presented on a computer
screen prior to purchase ("clickwrap"). A third group was told that they had been
presented with the contract terms of sales after opening the box in which the
computer had been delivered ("shrinkwrap"). We randomly assigned consumer
participants to one of the three conditions. In other words, a respondent saw the
signed writing, or the click-through, or terms in the box, but not all three.
Research participants' reactions to the manufacturer's refusal to refund the
purchase price were assessed at three points in time: first, after learning of the
manufacturer's refusal; then, after reviewing how contract terms of sale had been
presented to them; and finally, after being made aware of collateral damage
created by the faulty equipment. We assessed respondents' perceptions of the
manufacturer's behavior using three variables: the seller's legal obligation to
refund the purchase price, the seller's moral obligation to refund the purchase
price, and the fairness of the manufacturer's policy.
In addition to these primary variables, we asked about the buyer's perceived
assent o the terms, the reasonableness of the seller's presentation method, and the
reasonableness of the buyer's incomplete reading of the terms. We also inquired
about the respondents' real-life methods for dealing with defective products.
Finally, to provide some evidence of face validity of the experiment, we inquired
as to the familiarity and believability of hypothetical conditions. The structure
of the study is presented in Figure 1.
..... ). Id.
52. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1. Survey Design
Part 1. Baseline scenario
The product self-combusts. The manufacturer offers to replace but refuses to
refund the purchase price.
Part 2: Does How the Contract Terms Had Been Presented Influence
Perceived Seller Obligations?
Respondents read ONE of the following scenarios
Signed Writing Clickwrap Shrinkwrap
(Terms in the Box)
Part 3: Collateral Damage
The manufacturer refuses to cover other losses caused by the fire
Part 4: Do Views about the Commercial and Legal Systems Influence
Attitudes about Warranty Presentation Formats?
Part 5: Consumer Preferences for Contract Relief
The survey was administered via the Internet to 212 business students at a
major southwestern university. Survey assignment to the three presentation
format conditions was roughly equal with 67 study subjects assigned to the signed
writing format, 74 to the clickwrap, and 71 to the shrinkwrap. We compared
responses between groups. Below are the findings.
Part 1: Baseline Scenario
Method
Respondents were asked to carefully read the scenario and indicate the
manufacturer's obligation to refund the purchase price. All respondents read the
following:
Three weeks ago, you purchased a $1,000 laptop from a well-known
company that manufactures and retails computers and related equipment.
You used the computer without incident since then, but this morning,
when you booted up the computer, a small electric explosion flared out
of the keyboard and started a fire which destroyed the computer.
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
You contacted the computer company and reported the loss. The
company agrees that a defect likely caused the fire, and offers to ship a
new one of the same model, free of charge, overnight.
You didn't like having to deal with the fire. And you know that replacing
the lost data on your computer will be a big hassle.
And so you are unwilling to risk using that computer model again, and
request a refund of your purchase price. The company refuses.
We then asked respondents about the manufacturer's obligation, if any, to refund
the purchase price under these circumstances. Respondents indicated their
response by sliding a lever along a continuum of 0 to 10 anchored by Strongly
disagree/Strongly agree:
The computer company is morally obliged to refund the purchase price
to you
The computer company is legally obliged to refund the purchase price to
you.
Results and Discussion
Recall at this point consumer participants have not yet been informed of any
warranty provisions. Without that information, study participants thought he
manufacturer had a high moral and only a moderate legal obligation to refund the
purchase price. On a ten-point scale, the moral obligation was rated 6.99
(standard deviation = 2.88) and the legal 5.23 (standard deviation = 0.21). The
difference is statistically significant, meaning that the higher moral obligation
rating is unlikely due to chance. Notice that the standard deviation was very small
for the legal obligation. That means most respondents had similar answers. In
contrast, there was more variability in the moral obligation meaning some
respondents perceived a much higher obligation and others a much lower
obligation.
Part 2: Does How the Contract Terms Had Been Presented Influence Perceived
Seller Obligations?
Method
Next, we informed the study participants of the contract terms of service.
These terms, as set forth below, limit the computer manufacturer's liability to
repair or replacement of the defective computer.5 3 Recall that contract theory
53. This is a relatively common provision in sales of consumer goods, and such limitations
are generally enforceable. See U.C.C. § 2-316.
440 [Vol. 52:431
2019] BOILERPLATE: WHAT CONSUMERS
ACTUALLY THINK ABOUT IT
generally assumes buyers' assent to warranty terms when they have at least had
an opportunity to read and accept or reject the terms, but assumes that assent is
more doubtful if buyers have not been able to review the terms in advance." Do
consumers' subjective understandings match what contract heory suggests?
To find out, we told some consumer participants they had signed off on the
contract terms at the computer store prior to purchase ("signed writing"). We
informed other consumer participants that they had clicked "I agree" to the terms
presented on a computer screen prior to purchase ("clickwrap"). We told still
other consumer participants that they had been presented with the contract terms
of sales after opening the delivered box ("shrinkwrap"). In all cases, we told the
buyers that they had only glanced at the terms. Table 1 shows the scenarios.
54. See id. § 2-206.
55. See Fenminella, supra note 6.
INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:431
Table 1. How Research Respondents Were Informed of the Terms of Sale'
Signed Writing Clickwrap Shrinkwrap
Subjects in the "signed
writing" condition were
asked to carefully read the
scenario.
You had purchased the
computer at their company-
owned store. At the time of
purchase, you signed a two-
page "Terms of Sale"
agreement for the computer
and paid the purchase price.
On the second page of the



















You only glanced at the
"Terms of Sale" and did not
see the capitalized language.
Subjects in the "clickwrap"
condition were asked to carefully
read the scenario.
You purchased the computer from
the computer company's website.
Before you could confirm the
purchase, you were presented with
a screen labeled "Terms of Sale,"
with a link to the computer
company's terms. The screen said:
"I have read and agree to the
Company's Terms & Conditions
for this purchase." It would not let
you continue with the transaction
unless you clicked "I agree."
On the second page of the "Terms










IS LIMITED TO THE REPAIR
AND REPLACEMENT OF THE
MALFUNCTIONING OR
DEFECTIVE UNIT, AND
COMPANY SHALL HAVE NO
OTHER OBLIGATION.
You did not read the terms, but
simply clicked "I agree" and
proceeded with the transaction.
Subjects in the
"shrinkwrap " condition
were asked to carefully read
the scenario.
You had purchased the
computer by telephone from
the computer company's
toll-free number. When the
box arrived, it contained a
multi-page "Terms of Sale"
sheet.
On the second page of the



















You only glanced at the
'Terms of Sale" and did not
see the capitalized language.
Respondents read only one of the above three scenarios.
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We then asked respondents about warranty performance obligations under the
circumstances. Respondents indicated their responses by sliding a lever along a
continuum from 0 to 10 anchored by Strongly disagree/Strongly agree:
The computer company is morally obliged to refund the purchase price
to you.
The computer company is legally obliged to refund the purchase price to
you.
It is fair that the computer company would limit their responsibility to
repairing and replacing, rather than refunding the money for, the
defective unit.
We also inquired about the consumer's perception of assent o the terms and
the reasonableness of the company's presentation format (slider scale of 0 to 10
anchored by No/Yes):
Would you say you had actually agreed to the "Terms of Sale" of this
purchase?
Including the clause in the Terms of Sale you signed was a reasonable
way for the company to communicate the terms to you.
You acted reasonably in not reading the Terms of Sale carefully.
You acted responsibly in not reading the Terms of Sale carefully.
Results and Discussion
31 We uncovered no statistically significant differences between the signed
writing, clickwrap, and shrinkwrap groups with respect to the moral and legal
obligations of the company to refund the purchase price, to the fairness of the
company's policy, perceived assent, the reasonableness of the communication
method, nor the buyer's reasonableness and responsibility about not reading the
terms more carefully. Full results are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2. Consumer Perceptions of Warranty Obligations Related
to Purchase Refunds
Scenario
Company is morally Signed Writing







Company is legally Signed Writing 1.61 2.26
obliged to pay for extra Clickwrap Terms 1.76 2.57
damage Shrinkwrap Terms in the Box 2.08 2.61
Total 1.82 2.49
Fair for company to
avoid extra damage
liability
Signed Writing 5.11 2.90
Clickwrap Terms 5.92 2.85
Shrinkwrap Terms in the Box 5.60 2.70
Total 5.56 2.82
You had actually Signed Writing 5.22 3.33
AGREED to the Terms Clickwrap Terms 5.50 3.03
of Sale Shrinkwrap Terms in the Box 5.18 3.11
Total 5.30 3.14
Including the clause in
the Terms of Sale you Signed Writing 4.85
recived was a aCickwrap Terms 4.75
reasonable way for the
















to YOU. No (p <.69)
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Item Scenario Mean' SD' significant?2
You acted reasonably in Signed Writing 3.73 2.86
not reading Terms of Clickwrap Terms 3.89 2.61
Sale carefully Shrinkwrap Terms in the Box 3.79 2.50
Total 3.81 2.64 No (p <.94)
You acted responsibly Signed Writing 2.05 2.17
in not reading Terms of Clickwrap Terms 2.48 2.36
Sale carefully Shrinkwrap Terms in the Box 2.19 1.73
Total 2.25 2.10 No (p <.47)
Mean and SD refer to mean and standard deviation of the sample.
2 This column shows results from a test that the difference between the means of the three warranty
presentations is statistically significant. The p value (probability value) refers to the likelihood that the
null hypothesis is true. P ranges from 0 to 1. Large p values (typically, >.05), as observed in this table,
suggest any differences in the mean scores in the three warranty presentation format scenarios is due to
chance.
Respondents were ambivalent about whether they had actually agreed to the
terms of sale. Overall, respondents rated their agreement at 5.3, indicating they
might or might not have agreed. Similarly, respondents were ambivalent about
the reasonableness of the seller's approach to communicating the terms of sale,
with an overall rating of 4.9, indicating they neither agreed nor disagreed with the
reasonableness. Curiously, respondents were harsher on themselves, giving
themselves low marks for the reasonableness (3.81) and responsibility (2.25) of
not reading the terms more carefully.
In summary, when it comes to examining consumer attitudes toward warranty
performance, we found no differences based on how the warranty was presented.
We based our investigation on a familiar and common contract provision, namely
refusing to refund the purchase price in the case of defective merchandise. The
consumer was still held whole, in that the company agreed to replace the
defective merchandise.
But what if the consumer's out-of-pocket losses were more sizable and the
seller did not reimburse the consumer? Faced with bigger losses, would
consumers be qually indifferent to the way the terms of sale were presented? Our
next scenario addresses this.
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
Part 3: Consequential Damages
Method
To understand whether, in the face of more consequential osses, consumers
would be equally indifferent to the way the terms of sale were presented, we
presented an additional scenario to our study participants. We explained the fire
created collateral damage not covered by the warranty:
Assume that in addition to the loss of the laptop, the fire it started
required assistance from the Fire Department and resulted in $3,000 in
damage to the furnishings in your residence, not including the value of
the computer.
The Fire Department tells you that the fire was obviously caused by an
electricalfault in the computer.
You request hat the company pay for the additional damage caused by
the computer. The company refuses.
We then asked a battery of questions similar to those asked in Part 2.
Results and Discussion
Once again, we found no statistically significant differences related to the
presentation format for the computer company's moral or legal obligation to
cover the collateral damage, or the fairness of the company's refusal to cover the
collateral damage. Similarly, there were no statistically significant differences in
the perceived agreement o the terms nor to the reasonableness of the presentation
method. Details are presented in Table 3.
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Item Scenario Mean SD significant?
Company is morally
obliged to pay for extra
damage
Company is legally
obliged to pay for extra
damage
Fair for company to avoid
extra damage liability
You had actually
AGREED to the Terms of
Sale
Including the clause in the
Terms of Sale you received
was a reasonable way for
the company to
communicate to you the




















Shrinkwrap Terms in the Box
Total
Thus, while the current approach to enforceability considers how the
particular contract was created,56 we again fmd consumers have a different
perspective. Even faced with sizable collateral damage, consumers indicated no
statistically significant differences between the signed writing, clickwrap, and
shrinkwrap groups with respect to the moral and legal obligations of the company








to refund the purchase price, nor to the fairness of the company's policy, nor to
whether the consumer had actually agreed to the terms, nor to the reasonableness
of the company's method of communicating the warranty terms.
Part 4: Do Views about the Commercial and Legal Systems Influence Attitudes
about Warranty Presentation Formats?
Near the end of the experiment, we asked respondents about their overall
attitudes toward the commercial and legal systems. As summarized in Table 4,
our respondents believe businesses routinely attempt to take advantage of
consumers by using unfair contract terms (n = 6.4 on a 10-point scale anchored
by Disagree/Agree) and the legal system should resolve issues for consumer in
situations like this (n = 7.3). However, there is less agreement hat the legal
system does a good job in resolving such issues (n = 5.0) which explains,
presumably, why consumers shop with reputable sellers (n = 7.6).





The legal system should resolve issues for consumers in situations 7.26 2.18
like this
The legal system does a good job in resolving issues for 4.98 2.02
consumers such as this one
Businesses routinely attempt to take advantage of consumers by 6.39 2.46
using unfair contract terms
When I purchase items like laptops, I shop around and try to make 7.59 2.58
sure I am dealing with a seller that will stand behind the products
it sells.
* 10 point scale anchored by 0=Disagree/10=Agree
Do these general attitudes toward the commercial and legal systems influence
the ways our respondents replied? For example, perhaps people who think
businesses never craft unfair contracts see little legal obligations on the part of the
seller to refund the purchase price or to cover the collateral damage, whereas
more skeptical consumers do see a legal obligation. To investigate this
hypothesis, we reran our statistical analyses while controlling for underlying
commercial and legal attitudes. We found that, indeed, moral outrage was
consistently higher for believers in a strong legal system and for skeptics of
[Vol. 52:431
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business ethical practices. However, even by controlling for commercial and legal
attitudes, the way the warranty information was presented had no statistically
significant effect on the seller's perceived legal obligations.
We next sought insights into consumers' preferences for relief from onerous
terms of sale.
Part 5: Consumer Preferences for Contract Relief
Finally, we asked consumers about what they would do in real life, faced with
a similar situation of having sustained defective equipment and collateral loss
from the fire. Consumers indicated a likelihood of asking for a refund (n= 8.1; 10-
point scale anchored by Extremely unlikely--0/ Extremely likely=10) and of
asking for payment for the collateral losses (n=7.9). See Table 5 for details. As
expected, responses were not significantly different depending on how the
warranty information was presented.
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Table 5. Consumer Preference for Resolving Contract
Disputes
(n=212)
"In real life, how likely would you be
to"
Ask for a refund








"In real life, how likely would you be
to..."1
Post negative reviews
Use the company's arbitration
procedure for resolving customer
complaints if it were free
File a complaint with the appropriate
agency that deals with unfair consumer
practices
Contact a lawyer to discuss your
potential legal options against the
company
Use the company's arbitration
procedure, if it required you to pay
$100 upfront but which would be
refunded if you won the arbitration
Sue the company in your local small-
If the company offered a






If the company refused to
refund your










* 10 point scale anchored by 0=Extremely unlikely/10=Extremely
likely
We then asked consumers how they would handle a real-life situation in
which the seller offered to refund the purchase price but refused to cover
collateral damage. Consumers were most likely to write a negative review (n=7.5)
or use the company's free arbitration procedure (n=6.9), and less likely to use the
2019] BOILERPLATE: WHAT CONSUMERS 451
ACTUALLY THINK ABOUT IT
company's fee-based arbitration (n-5.5) or to sue in small claims court (n=5.2).
A similar pattern of responses emerged if the company refused to refund the
purchase price and to cover the collateral damage expenses.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Opportunity to Ignore
Our study involved one of the richest examinations of consumer attitudes
toward contracting in the literature. The key takeaway for our purposes (see Table
2) is that we uncovered no statistically significant differences between the signed
writing, clickwrap, and shrinkwrap groups with respect to (a) the moral and legal
obligations of the company to refund the purchase price, (b) the fairness of the
company's policy, (c) the consumers' own views of their perceived assent, (d) the
reasonableness of the seller's method of communicating the terms, or (e) the
consumer's own responsibility to read and reasonableness in not reading the
terms more carefully. It simply does not matter to consumers how or when they
get the terms.
We do not believe that this finding should be surprising. It is difficult to
imagine that an ordinary consumer would think that the terms of the contract he
was entering into would differ significantly based on whether he bought it online
or in a store.57 We doubt that even a lawyer, without having previously been
immersed in the niceties of common-law contracts and the UCC, would suspect
that there might be a significant difference.
Clearly, it is in the interest of mass sellers that all of their contracts be formed
on the same set of terms, regardless of the particular channel in which the
particular good or service passed. Uncertainty is expensive. It might nevertheless
be reasonable to impose different rules, if we concluded that it was important to
consumers to do so. But our study suggests hat it is entirely unimportant to them.
On the other hand, it is clearly in the interest of consumers to have contract terms
that provide reasonable remedies and avoid unfaimess. It seems to us that
unobjectionable terms should routinely be enforced, and objectionable ones
should be stricken.
If so, then current law and the RCC approach to formation, are misguided.58
Consumers do not appear to value the opportunity to see the terms before they
buy. Our study suggests that consumers are much more interested in what the
terms are rather than how they were delivered or when they were received. It
seems odd to tell a consumer who objects to an apparently unfair term that, "You
57. See Gan, supra note 4, at 648-49, see also Oman, supra note 4, at 236-242.
58. See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Council
Draft No. 5 2018). This is not to say that the RCC is not a potentially valuable contribution.
Although we critique its focus on the time of term delivery, its provisions do offer a clear roadmap
to sellers on how to minimize uncertainly by more plainly spelling out what kinds of things will or
will not be viewed as adequate disclosure.
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should have bought it over the telephone, not online." A better approach from a
consumer protection perspective might be greater policing of standard terms for
unfairness-something that the RCC itself takes pains to emphasize.9
As to the surge in scholarship emphasizing the importance of "assent," it
suffers from a similar problem. The language of the scholarship focuses on
increasing disclosure, but that is unlikely to have much effect. Much of it seems
rooted in antipathy to standard contract terms imposed by business.6" But if these
standard terms are unfair or unreasonable, requiring more disclosure and adding
greater requirements for finding "assent" seems an awkward way to go about
dealing with the problem. Much of the opposition building to the RCC, for
example, is based on the argument that it does not go far enough in requiring
some kind of voluntary assent o terms.61 But adding more layers of disclosure
and requiring extra buttons to click would seem to make transactions more
cumbersome without solving the root problems.
B. Other Findings
In addition to our primary finding, our study raised several interesting issues
that could certainly use further exploration.
First, there is the question of whether consumers, when they entered into
contracts, thought that they had actually agreed (i.e., expressed assent) to all the
standard terms? On the whole, they were not sure (n = 5.3), but there was
unusually high variability. Some rated this very high (they clearly felt they had
agreed) and others very low (they did not believe they had at all). We did not
explore this in any detail, and we do not know what caused the variation.62
Second, we found-not too surprisingly-that consumers did differentiate
between sellers' moral and legal obligations. The moral obligation to refund was
rated considerably higher (n = 6.99) than the legal obligation (n = 5.25).
Consumers plainly think sellers ought to refund their money but are equivocal
over sellers' legal obligation to do SO.6 3 This may reflect general distrust of the
legal system's protection of consumers, but more research would be necessary to
determine that.
Third, we noted an interesting correlation between moral and legal obligation.
Consumers who were told the applicable legal rule tended to change their view
of moral obligation to align more closely with the legal standard. This is not
59. Id.
60. Oman, supra note 4, at 239-242.
61. Id., see also RADIN, supra note 4, at 82.
62. It may be due to the vagueness of the word "agree," which we did not define. Some
respondents thus may have thought we were asking "did you subjectively agree?" while others
thought we were asking "are you bound to the terms?"
63. We do not know why they think this. They might simply be ignorant of legal rules and
opt for a median position, neither yes nor no. They might be cynical about the law, believing that
it will favor businesses over them. They might even be knowledgeable about the legal rules and
understand that a monetary refund is not a remedy that is ordinarily available in contract litigation.
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surprising, but the effect was plainly significant here (n = 6.99 to n = 5.67).
Fourth, we saw that consumers plainly think they ought to read contract
terms, even though they never do. They believe themselves irresponsible (n =
2.25) and unreasonable (n = 3.81) in failing to do so. How and why they feel this
way-whether it is, for example, rooted in their notions of personal responsibility
or in the idea that everyone is supposed to know the law-we cannot say.
V. CONCLUSION
There are few more vexing questions in contract law than that of how we
should deal with standard boilerplate terms imposed on consumer buyers. We
have shown here that much of the current law, and proposals for clarifying it, may
be misguided. We believe that a superior approach will focus less on theforrn the
contract process takes-ensuring that consumers have what we have called a right
to ignore-and more on the substantive utility and fairness of the terms.
